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I. INTRODUCTION
Close your eyes and imagine yourself as an African-American
woman.1 You are in your late thirties and have two children.2 You do
not have a driver’s license because you do not drive a car.3 Instead,
you use an identification card issued to you by the State of
Massachusetts for residents who do not drive.4 On November 21,
2012, one day before Thanksgiving, you take your children shopping
for Christmas presents.5 You go to a Kmart store in Braintree,
Massachusetts, because it is easily accessible by public transportation.6

Candidate for J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law, 2016. Mr. Quevedo
Gutierrez is from Palmdale, California and received his Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science from California State University, Northridge.
1
The following scenario derives its facts directly from Hammond v. Kmart Corp.
733 F.3d 360, 361 (1st Cir. 2013).
2
Id.
3
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Hammond, 733 F.3d 360 (No. 13-998), 2014
WL 662136, at *3.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
∗
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In addition, you shop at Kmart because you want to take advantage of
Kmart’s Layaway Program.7
Once your children have picked out their Christmas presents,
you take their presents to the layaway counter.8 You had a rather
uneventful experience shopping at Kmart until you hand your
identification card to the Kmart sales clerk.9 To your surprise, the
sales clerk barrages you with racist insults while putting your
children’s Christmas presents on layaway.10
Among many things, the sales clerk asks you if you are going
to be “‘jumping the counter’ to get what [you need]” and refers to your
identification card as a “liquor ID.”11 After this conversation, imagine
how you would feel with your children listening to every word the
sales clerk has uttered. You—in this imaginary world—are a “porch
monkey,”12 and no one is reaching out to help you. Instead, even the
courts—while not endorsing this type of behavior—find that the law is
not on your side.13 But in an effort to avoid further incident in front of
your children, you bite your tongue and proceed with the layaway
purchase and hope that one day you will receive justice.14
Now open your eyes and realize that your imagination is the
reality of Chenell Hammond (Hammond), the plaintiff in Hammond v.
Kmart Corp.15 The sales clerk at Kmart harassed Hammond because
she was an African-American woman.16 Hammond, who has
experienced discrimination because of her race in retail stores, has few
legal remedies. A circuit split regarding the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
in the retail setting allowed Hammond’s disparate treatment. The
First,17 Fifth,18 Seventh,19 Eighth,20 and Eleventh Circuits21 “have

7

Id. “In a layaway transaction a retailer agrees to hold merchandise, which a
customer secures by making a deposit. The customer can retain the merchandise
once the price is paid in full.” Hammond, 733 F.3d at 361 n.1. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 968 (9th ed. 2009).
8
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 4.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 5.
11
Hammond, 733 F.3d at 361.
12
Id.
13
See id. at 365.
14
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 5.
15
733 F.3d at 360.
16
Id. at 361.
17
See, e.g., id. at 362 (explaining that in order “[t]o state a claim under § 1981, a
plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant
discriminated against her on the basis of her race; and (3) the discrimination
implicated one or more of the activities listed in the statute, including the right to
make and enforce contracts”).
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added an extra-textual element to the plaintiff’s burden of proof.”22
According to these circuits, a defendant violates § 1981 only when his
or her discriminatory conduct prevents the plaintiff from completing a
transaction.23 In contrast, according to the Third24 and Sixth
Circuits,25 a defendant violates § 1981 when he or she treats the
plaintiff in a markedly hostile manner during the course of the
transaction, even if the plaintiff nevertheless completes the
transaction.26 Although the Third and Sixth Circuits may be
outnumbered, their interpretations of § 1981 remain most faithful to its
text27 and to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.28

18

See, e.g., Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing
Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 752 (5th Cir. 2001)) (explaining
that in order to state a claim under § 1981 for discrimination in the retail setting, the
plaintiff “‘must offer evidence of . . . an attempt to contract’ . . . [which was] in some
way . . . ‘thwarted’”).
19
See, e.g., Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
the plaintiffs did not have an actionable claim under § 1981 because “[t]hey were
denied neither admittance nor service”).
20
See, e.g., Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 853 (8th Cir.
2001) (affirming that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1981 because the
plaintiff had completed the purchase).
21
See, e.g., Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding
that a Hispanic customer cannot state a claim under § 1981 when he “was able to
complete his transaction”).
22
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 2.
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 92 (3d. Cir. 1978) (holding that it
was enough to state a § 1981 claim when plaintiff “received disparate, and because it
was based on race, disparaging treatment for which the record [offered] no
justification”).
25
See, e.g., Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a plaintiff could claim a § 1981 violation in the retail setting by proving
that he “received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a
reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory”).
26
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 2-3.
27
Id. at 2.
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, given evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009).
28
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). “That all . . . citizens of the United
States . . . , of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence . . . and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Id.

114

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol. 4:1

The purpose of this comment is to discuss how the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is moving away from the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Part II
will discuss the development of § 1981. Part III will discuss the First
Circuit’s Hammond case. Part IV will discuss court decisions contrary
to Hammond and hypothesize as to how Hammond would have been
resolved had the case been tried in the Third or Sixth Circuit. Finally,
Part V will discuss why the approach in Hammond is unreasonable for
analyzing a claim under §1981.
II. THE BIRTH OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Congress ratified the Thirteenth Amendment on December 6,
1865.29 In response, Southern states enacted “Black Codes” designed
to “recreat[e] conditions of slavery for newly freed African Americans
through acts of private discrimination.”30 Thus, Congress sought to
“reconstruct[] Southern minds” to make them recognize “that the
abolition of slavery had created an economic and social vacuum in the
South.”31 As a result, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866.32
The Equal Rights Under the Law provision of the Act read in part:
[C]itizens of the United States . . . , of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory in the United States,
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . .
. .33
Ultimately, the Equal Rights Under the Law provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 became today’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981, outlining
the right to contract, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, outlining the right to

29

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
Charlotte H. Sanders, Come Down and Make Bargains in Good Faith: The
Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Race and National Origin Discrimination in
Retail Stores, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 281, 285 (2007).
31
Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper
Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 548 (1989).
32
Sanders, supra note 30, at 285.
33
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
30
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purchase, hold, and sell real and personal property.34 The principal
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to give “real content to
the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment.”35
Years later, courts held that § 1981 not only covers public acts
of discrimination, but also private acts of discrimination. For example,
in Runyon v. McCrary, Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales, two
African-American students, sued Russell and Katheryne Runyon, the
proprietors of a private school, for denying them admission to the
private school based on the students’ race.36 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted injunctive relief for
the students and awarded their parents compensatory damages.37 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
affirmed the district court’s holding,38 and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed.39 The central question for the Court was “whether §
1981 prohibit[ed] private, commercially operated, nonsectarian
schools from denying admission to prospective students because they
are [African-American].”40
In answering the question in the
affirmative, the Court held that the argument “that § 1981 does not
reach private acts of racial discrimination . . . is wholly inconsistent
with . . . the legislative history of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.”41 For that reason, the Court held that § 1981 reaches private
conduct.42
But in 1989, the Supreme Court restricted the definition of §
1981’s use of the phrase “make and enforce” contracts.43 For
example, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, Brenda Patterson, a
female African-American employee, sued McLean Credit Union
(McLean) for employment discrimination based on her race.44 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
agreed with McLean that a claim for racial harassment was not

34

Sanders, supra note 30, at 286.
Abby Morrow Richardson, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Claims of Consumer
Discrimination, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 123 (2005) (citing Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 433 (1968)).
36
427 U.S. 160, 164 (1976).
37
Id. at 166.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 186.
40
Id. at 168.
41
Id. at 173.
42
Id.
43
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (restricting racial
harassment claims in an employment setting from being recognized under § 1981).
44
Id. at 169.
35
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actionable under § 1981.45 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.46 Similarly, the
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal of Patterson’s
racial harassment claim as not actionable.47 In this case, Patterson
alleged that McLean harassed her, failed to promote her, and
ultimately fired her because of her race.48 Therefore, the question was
whether a victim of work-place racial harassment could file a claim
under § 1981.49 In answering this question, the Court stated that “[t]he
most obvious feature of [§ 1981] is the restriction of its scope
forbidding discrimination in the ‘mak[ing] and enforce[ment]’ of
contracts alone.”50
Therefore, “[w]here an alleged act of
discrimination does not involve the impairment of [making or
enforcing a contract], § 1981 provides no relief.”51 In other words,
“the harassment and discrimination that [Patterson] suffered fell
outside § 1981’s coverage because it took place after the initial
formation of the employment contract,”52 and “postformation conduct
does not involve the right to make [or enforce] a contract.”53
In response to “[Pattterson]’s narrow construction of the
nation’s oldest and most important civil rights statutes,”54 Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.55 Specifically, Congress added
subsections (b) and (c) so that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 now reads:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
....
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined
For the purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce
contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and

45

Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 170.
47
Id. at 189.
48
Id. at 169.
49
Id. at 170.
50
Id. at 176 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009)).
51
Id.
52
Sanders, supra note 30, at 290.
53
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177.
54
Richardson, supra note 35, at 129.
55
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009)).
46
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termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of State law.56
In a later memorandum, Congress stated that “[t]he list set
forth in subsection (b) is illustrative only, and should be given broad
construction to allow a remedy for any act of intentional
discrimination committed in the making or the performance of a
contract.”57 In other words, the list in subsection (b) “should only be a
starting point, a floor, rather than a ceiling.”58
III. HAMMOND V. KMART
Although Congress negated the holding of Patterson with the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts continue to interpret § 1981 in the
retail setting as if Congress had never amended it.59 Specifically,
courts are narrowly interpreting § 1981 by “focusing exclusively on
the ‘make and enforce’ clause and acknowledging only a few
actionable privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions under subsection
(b).”60 Specifically, courts have added an extra-textual element to the
plaintiff’s burden of proof by requiring that the defendant’s
discriminatory conduct prevented the plaintiff from completing a
transaction.61
In Hammond v. Kmart Corp., Hammond filed a lawsuit against
Kmart Corporation (Kmart), bringing a § 198162 claim of racial
discrimination.63 The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted Kmart’s motion to dismiss, holding that
Hammond “fail[ed] to make any factual averments to support a claim
that the store clerk’s comments, described as ‘racially demeaning,
insulting, rude, and discriminatory,’ precluded [Hammond] from
making or enforcing her layaway contract with Kmart.”64 The United

56

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009).
137 CONG. REC. 29,046 (1991).
58
Sanders, supra note 30, at 305.
59
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 21.
60
Sanders, supra note 30, at 295.
61
See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
62
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009).
63
733 F.3d 360, 361 (1st Cir. 2013).
64
Id. at 362.
57
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States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision, holding that to state a § 1981 claim, “the alleged
discrimination must interfere in some way” with a contractual
relationship.65 The facts in Hammond are not disputed: Hammond
entered into and performed a contract with Kmart while a Kmart’s
sales clerk barraged Hammond with racist insults.66 In affirming
Hammond’s dismissal, the First Circuit noted that the pivotal question
was whether Hammond “was actually denied the ability either to
make, perform, enforce, modify, or terminate a contract, or to enjoy
the fruits of a contractual relationship, by reason of race-based
animus.”67 Answering this question, the court held that Hammond did
not “allege that [she] was unable to complete her layaway transaction .
. . [or] that the Kmart’s sales clerk refused to help Hammond, forced
Hammond to use something other than the normal layaway procedure,
or otherwise contracted with Hammond on different terms than other
customers.”68 In other words, “[t]here is no claim that Hammond did
not receive the purchases she had placed on layaway.”69 The First
Circuit explained that a § 1981 claim “must allege the actual loss of a
contract interest.”70 Because Hammond alleged only discriminatory
treatment during the course of an otherwise successfully completed
contract, the First Circuit found that the district court properly
dismissed Hammond’s complaint.71
The First Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he scope of § 1981’s
coverage has changed over time.”72 Specifically, the court noted that
Congress amended § 1981 in 1991 to negate the holding of Patterson,
which had interpreted § 1981 to prohibit discrimination only in the
making and enforcement of contracts, and not in the performance of
contracts.73 The court pointed out that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amended the statutory phrase “make and enforce contracts” to include
the “performance” of contracts, as well as the “enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual
relationship.”74 Although the amendment expanded the coverage of §
1981, the court nevertheless concluded that this statutory language was

65

Id. at 364 (citing Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 101 (1st Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 361.
67
Id. at 362 (emphasis omitted) (citing Garrett, 295 F.3d at 100-01).
68
Id. at 364.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 365 (citing Garrett, 295 F.3d at 102).
71
Id. at 366.
72
Id. at 362.
73
Hammond, 733 F.3d at 362-363.
74
Id. at 363 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2009)).
66
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not broad enough to encompass the discriminatory comments the sales
clerk made to Hammond.75
The ramifications of the district court’s decision upon victims
of discrimination are clear. As mentioned before, to state a § 1981
claim, the alleged discrimination has to interfere in some way with the
right to make and enforce a contract.76 The requirement of
interference wrongly fails to focus on the victim of discrimination and
rather focuses on the person discriminating. For example, if
Hammond decided not to place her children’s Christmas presents on
layaway because of racial epithets, although the sales clerk was willing
to place them on hold, albeit in a hostile manner, could Hammond
have stated a claim under § 1981? Courts have answered that question
in the negative. For example, in Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., where a
sales clerk barraged the plaintiffs with racist insults, the court held that
the plaintiffs could not recover under § 1981 because the plaintiffs
voluntarily chose not to make the purchase.77 Therefore, when the
sales clerk barraged Hammond with racist insults, she had two options:
(1) voluntarily walk away and lose the opportunity to bring a lawsuit,
or (2) proceed with the layaway purchase and face humiliation. To
state a § 1981 claim, Hammond had to allege that the Kmart sales
clerk prevented her from completing her layaway transaction, “refused
to help [her], forced [her] to use something other than normal layaway
procedure, or otherwise contracted with [her] on different terms than
other customers.”78
IV. OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS
Other circuit courts have held that “discriminatory harassment
of a contractual customer violates § 1981 whether or not such
harassment ‘blocks’ or ‘thwarts’ the formation of a contract.”79 For
example, in Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Lois Christian, an
African-American customer, sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart)
for accusing her of shoplifting and asking her to leave the store.80 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted
summary judgment for Wal-Mart.81 However, the United States Court

75

Id. at 364.
Id. at 365.
77
330 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2003).
78
Hammond, 733 F.3d at 364.
79
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Hammond, 733 F.3d 360 (No. 13-998), 2014 WL
1260528, at *2.
80
252 F.3d 862, 864 (6th Cir. 2001).
81
Id. at 866.
76
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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Wal-Mart.82 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit held
that to establish a § 1981 claim, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class;
(2) plaintiff sought to make or enforce a contract for services
ordinarily provided by the defendant; and
(3) . . . plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile
manner and in a manner which a reasonable person
would find objectively discriminatory.83
Therefore, § 1981 claims in the Sixth Circuit may survive when an
employee subjects a customer to race discrimination, regardless of
whether the discrimination prevents the customer from completing a
transaction.84 The Sixth Circuit noted that this is the most useful test
for courts when evaluating claims of race discrimination because it
accounts “for situations in the commercial establishment context in
which a plaintiff cannot identify other similarly situated persons”
outside of the protected class.85
Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that a customer can bring
a § 1981 claim if the customer experienced discrimination, even if the
customer successfully completed the transaction.86 For example,
in Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, Arthur Hall, an AfricanAmerican man sued the Pennsylvania State Police Department and a
local bank for implementing a policy in which they targeted only
African-American customers for their concerted program of
photographing “suspicious-looking” individuals.87 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed Hall’s
discrimination claim.88 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the district court’s holding.89 In doing so, the
Third Circuit held that, although the police department’s
discriminatory program did not prevent the plaintiff from completing
his banking transactions, he nevertheless stated a claim against the
bank under § 1981 because he received disparate and disparaging
treatment that was based on race for which the record offers no

82

Id. at 880.
Id. at 872.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 871.
86
See Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1978).
87
Id. at 88.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 92.
83
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justification.90 Although the disparate treatment did not thwart the
plaintiff from entering into a contract with the bank, the plaintiff’s
"disparaging treatment [based on race] for which the record offers no
justification," was enough to state a claim under § 1981.91
A. District Courts
Other courts have also found that a § 1981 claim exists when
the customer forms a contract, but with unequal privileges, benefits,
terms, or conditions. For example, in Williams v. Cloverleaf Farms
Dairy, Inc., Rathea Williams, an African-American woman, sued
Cloverleaf Farms Dairy, Inc. (Cloverleaf), because Cloverleaf violated
her right to buy items free from race discrimination.92 The United
States District Court for the District of Maryland found for Williams.93
In this case, Williams attempted to make a purchase but was met with
racial slurs instead.94 After some delay, another cashier completed
Williams’s sale.95 In doing so, the district court held that “[a]lthough
Williams was eventually able to purchase items from another cashier,
the Court refuses to find that this delay in completing the transaction,
coupled with alleged racial attack, is insufficient as a matter of law to
establish a violation of § 1981.”96 In other words, “the combination of
the delay and the racial slurs constituted an alteration in the contract’s
terms and conditions.”97
Although Williams is persuasive, rather than authoritative, for
the First Circuit, it nonetheless has merit. For example, ten years
before Williams, the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union.98 In Patterson, Justice Brennan, concurring, viewed
post-formation discriminatory conduct as a demonstration that a
contract was not really made on equal terms.99 Justice Brennan
provided the following example:
[I]f an employer offers a black and a white applicant for
employment the same written contract, but then tells the

90

Id.
Id.
92
78 F. Supp. 2d 479, 482-83 (D. Md. 1999).
93
Id. at 485.
94
Id. at 483.
95
Id. at 485.
96
Id.
97
Sanders, supra note 30, at 298.
98
491 U.S. 164 (1988).
99
Id. at 207-08 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91
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black employee that her working conditions will be
much worse than those of the white hired for the same
job because “there’s a lot of harassment going on in this
workplace and you have to agree to that,” it would have
to be concluded that the white and black had not
enjoyed an equal right to make a contract.100
Connecting Justice Brennan’s hypothetical to retail contracts,
Charlotte H. Sanders, a professor of law at Georgia State University
College of Law, suggests that “because it is nearly impossible to make
a purchase without interacting with some store personnel, the quality
of the service provided by that personnel must then be part of the
customer’s contract with the store.”101 Therefore:
[t]he retail store analog to Justice Brennan’s
hypothetical job offer is a circumstance in which a
retailer states to customers, “you can make purchases in
my store, but if you are African American, Latin[
American], or Asian American, you will have to suffer
racial harassment in order to do so.”102
B. Application
If Hammond had lived in the Third or Sixth Circuits,103 the
outcome of her case would have been different.
Analyzing
Hammond’s case under the Sixth Circuit test, it is easy to conclude
that Hammond meets the first two prongs of the test.104 First, as an
African-American woman, she is a member of a protected class.105
Second, there is no trouble concluding that Hammond made herself
available to enter into a contractual relationship for services ordinarily

100

Id. at 208.
Sanders, supra note 30, at 314 (footnote omitted).
102
Id.
103
The Third Circuit comprises the States of Delaware, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. Court Locator, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last visited March 30, 2015). The Sixth
Circuit comprises the States of Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee. Id.
104
Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001) (identifying
the first two prongs in a commercial establishment case as: “(1) plaintiff is a member
of a protected class; [and] (2) plaintiff sought to make or enforce a contract for
services ordinarily provided by the defendant”).
105
Hammond v. Kmart Corp., 733 F.3d 360, 362 (1st Cir. 2013) (“It is undisputed
that Hammond, an African-American, is a member of a racial minority.”).
101
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provided by Kmart.106 Therefore, the remainder of the analysis will
focus on the third part of the Sixth Circuit test: whether Hammond
received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner that a
reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.107
Here, Hammond was at Kmart with her two children.108
In order to place several items on layaway, she needed
to give the sales clerk her identification card, which
indicated she lived in Roxbury, Massachusetts, a part of
Boston which has a high percentage of AfricanAmerican residents. Upon receiving this identification
card, the white sales clerk asked if Hammond would be
“jumping the counter to get what she needed because
she is from Roxbury.” The clerk also labeled the
identification card [as] a “liquor ID.”109
The clerk then commented that she used to live near Roxbury, “but
had to move because of ‘porch monkeys’ in that area.”110 “Hammond
was ‘humiliated and deeply offended’ by the [clerk’s] comments,
which she believed reflected the sales clerk’s belief that [Hammond]
was ‘poor, inferior and violent . . . because she is African
American.’”111 The facts show that Hammond raised a genuine issue
of fact that she received services in a markedly hostile manner.
Further, the clerk’s treatment of Hammond was hostile and objectively
discriminatory because it was profoundly contrary to the financial
interests of Kmart and far outside of widely accepted business norms.
Kmart may argue, however, that the clerk had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for uttering racial epithets towards Hammond.
For example, Kmart may argue that the clerk suspected that Hammond
would “jump the counter.”112 But that argument fails because
Hammond can prove that she was a victim of intentional
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discrimination by showing that (1) Kmart’s stated reason had no basis
in fact, (2) the stated reason was not the actual reason, and (3) that the
stated reason was not sufficient to explain the clerk’s actions.113 First,
the clerk had no basis in fact because Hammond did not “jump the
counter.” Second, it is reasonable to believe that the clerk did not
actually believe that Hammond would “jump the counter” because the
clerk took no further action, such as calling the police or security.
Third, the fact that Hammond is from Roxbury was not sufficient to
believe that Hammond would “jump the counter.” Therefore, once we
eliminate Kmart’s justifications, discrimination may well be the most
likely alternative explanation, especially since Kmart was in the best
position to explain its actions but failed to do so.
Analyzing Hammond’s case under the Third Circuit test,114 it is
clear that Hammond received disparaging treatment based on race for
which the record offers no justification. Hammond was an AfricanAmerican woman, and the clerk began barraging Hammond upon
discovering that she resided in Roxbury.115 Further, as described
above, the record in Hammond offers no justification for Hammond’s
disparate treatment. Thus, because § 1981 obligates Kmart to extend
the same treatment to Hammond as enjoyed by white citizens,
Hammond would have stated a § 1981 claim in the Third Circuit.
V. UNREASONABLE APPROACHES TO § 1981
Courts that interpret § 1981 narrowly do so out of fear that,
without limits, § 1981 will become a “generalized anti-discrimination
law that would regulate a wide variety of private behavior.”116 In
Hammond, for example, the First Circuit held that § 1981 “does not
provide a general cause of action for race discrimination.”117
According to the First Circuit, “to state a [§ 1981] claim a plaintiff
must initially identify an impaired ‘contractual relationship,’ . . . under
which the plaintiff has rights.”118 Otherwise, the First Circuit states,
“§ 1981 would become a catch-all remedy to racial discrimination,
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‘produci[ng] satellite . . . litigation of immense scope.”119 However,
Congress negated the holding of Patterson and amended § 1981 to
prohibit discrimination in all aspects of contracting.120 And “[r]ead
literally, the statute prohibits only discrimination in the making and
performance of contracts, so is not a catch-all remedy to racial
discrimination.121 In addition, and as mentioned in Christian v. WalMart Stores, Inc., the defendant can shift the burden of proof back to
the plaintiff by showing that the defendant had a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for acting the way it did.122 Thus, although
courts’ attention to limiting § 1981 may be reasonable, “courts have
responded to a reasonable fear in an unreasonable way.”123
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Hammond endorses discrimination. Hammond
acknowledges that there is discrimination in the world, and that it is
best not to address it. But it is those that discriminate that deserve our
contempt. America has gained very little by not confronting
discrimination. It is only when we confront discrimination that it wilts
in the power of justice. The Hammond decision not only reflects the
view of a circuit fearful of creating satellite litigation, and a case
ignored by the Supreme Court in its denial of certiorari,124 but it also
reflects a precedent, setting the terms for appropriate behavior in the
First Circuit. How will Kmart advise its employees to treat its
customers of African-American, Latin American, or Asian American
descent, or any other racial minority in the future? How will other
department stores advise their employees?
How many more
Hammonds will have to deal with discrimination without legal
remedies? This decision permits discrimination to continue without
redress for millions of American consumers who are racially profiled,
harassed, or, like Hammond, simply required to endure painfully
substandard service so that they may be able to purchase toys for their
kids.
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